This paper reviews the basic concepts of modelling common-cause failures (CCFs) in reliability and risk studies and then applies these concepts to the treatment of CCF in event assessment. The cases of a failed component (with and without shared CCF potential) and a component being unavailable due to preventive maintenance or testing are addressed. The treatment of two related failure modes (e.g. failure to start and failure to run) is a new feature of this paper, as is the treatment of asymmetry within a common-cause component group.
INTRODUCTION
The treatment of common-cause failures (CCFs) in probabilistic risk assessments (PRAs) and reliability studies is well established in the literature and in practice. References [1] and [2] were a concerted effort of the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) to unify the basic principles underlying CCF analysis. Reference [3] provided guidance to analysts performing CCF analyses as part of PRAs and risk studies. Reference [4] is an update to references [2] and [3] .
The US NRC has developed a CCF database that is built upon the principles presented in references [1] to [4] . The technical reports [5] [6] [7] [8] associated with the database address the collection of CCF data and estimation of CCF parameters. CCF parameter estimates were published in reference [9] . Current updates to those estimates are found at http:// nrcoe.inl.gov/results under 'Common-cause failures'. Not all of the CCF effort has been focused on the quantification of CCF and estimation of CCF parameters. Efforts have also been spent on understanding the concepts associated with CCF and how to defend against them. Reference [10] contains a good summary of these concepts. CCF insights for emergency diesel generators (EDGs), motor-operated valves (MOVs), pumps, and circuit breakers are presented in references [11] to [14] .
Event assessment is an application of PRA in which observed equipment failures and outages are mapped on to the risk model to obtain a numerical estimate of the event's risk significance. Such an assessment can be either prospective, as when utilities use PRA as an aid in planning and scheduling equipment maintenance, or retrospective, such as in the NRC's Significance Determination Process (SDP) [15] . The event assessment is future-oriented, in the sense that one is trying to estimate the conditional probability of core damage, should the event occur again under nominally identical conditions. Because the actual event did not lead to core damage, one does not model the event exactly as it transpired, as this would lead to a conditional core damage probability (CCDP) of zero. Instead, one accounts for the possibility that equipment that functioned successfully in the actual event might, with some probability, fail to function in a future recurrence of the event. Thus, failure probabilities are left at their nominal values, or adjusted as necessary to reflect the conditions of the event. The adjustment to CCF probability is particularly important, as it is insufficient to simply leave CCF probabilities at their nominal values, and doing so may result in a significant underestimate of CCDP for the event.
Treatment of CCF in event assessment requires an understanding of CCF modelling and also conditional probability. For example, CCF has been treated in the NRC's Accident Sequence Precursor (ASP) analyses [16] , but no formal guidance existed for many years. In the mid 1990s, the NRC focused on this topic. CCF experts and risk analysts met in a working meeting and discussed this topic. They discussed the cases where a component has failed and where it is unavailable due to preventive maintenance or testing. They came to a consensus regarding the treatment of some limited aspects of CCF in event assessment. The results of these discussions are documented in reference [17] and Appendix E of reference [4] .
This early guidance was limited in that it did not address the issue of multiple failure modes, which exist for standby components that must both change state and perform a function for a specified period of time. Examples of such components in commercial nuclear plants are pumps and EDGs. In addition, in recent years a third case has been identified as important. This new case involves a failed component, but where evidence exists that the failure is independent, i.e. it does not involve the potential for CCF. NRC and commercial plant licensees have discussed this situation on a case-by-case basis for specific event evaluations.
The purpose of this paper is to extend the earlier work on the treatment of CCF in event assessment. Results are presented for the following three cases: (a) component failure with potential for CCF of redundant components; (b) failed component due to an independent cause (no CCF potential); and (c) component unavailable due to preventive maintenance or testing. The paper also addresses CCF treatment for two failure modes (e.g. failure to start and failure to run). It is assumed that the reader is familiar with the basic concepts for treating CCF in PRA, as detailed in reference [1] , but a review of the standard approach is provided as a way of introducing notation.
REVIEW OF CCF MODELLING IN PRA
A common-cause component group (CCCG) is a group of components that is modelled in a fault tree. A common-cause basic event (CCBE) is an event representing failure of a specific set of components in the CCCG due to a common cause. For instance, in a CCCG of three redundant components labelled A, B, and C, the CCBEs are C AB , C AC , C BC , and C ABC . The first three events are CCF events involving only two components (i.e., A and B, A and C, or B and C), and the fourth is a CCF event involving all three components. Note that the CCBEs are only identified by the impact they have on specific sets of components within the CCCGs. Impact in this context is limited to 'failed' or 'not failed'. Note also that the cause of failure is not modelled explicitly, and several CCF mechanisms may be included implicitly in a single CCBE.
The complete set of basic events, including CCBEs, involving component A in the three-component CCCG is A I = single independent failure of component A (a basic event) C AB = failure of components A and B (and not C) from common causes C AC = failure of components A and C (and not B) from common causes C ABC = failure of components A, B, and C from common causes Component A fails if any of the above events occur. Similar basic events are defined for components B and C. The equivalent Boolean representation of total failure of components A, B, and C is given by
where A t = total failure of A from all causes B t = total failure of B from all causes C t = total failure of C from all causes A I = failure of A from independent causes B I = failure of B from independent causes C I = failure of C from independent causes C AB = failure of A and B from common causes C AC = failure of A and C from common causes C BC = failure of B and C from common causes C ABC = failure of A, B, and C from common causes.
This representation of the total failure probability of a component in terms of independent and common-cause events is known as the basic parameter model (BPM) [1] .
Incorporation of CCBEs into the componentlevel fault tree
In this step, the component-level fault tree is expanded in terms of the CCBEs. As an example of this expansion, consider a CCCG of three identical components, A, B, and C, with a two-out-of-three success logic. In addition assume that, based on the qualitative and quantitative CCF screening, these three components constitute a single CCCG. The component-level fault tree of this CCCG is shown in Fig. 1 . Note that the minimal cut sets of this fault tree are fA; Bg; fA; Cg; fB; Cg
The expansion of this fault tree down to the commoncause impact level can be achieved by replacing each of the three component basic events by the corresponding CCBE fault tree. For component A, for instance, the basic event A is replaced by the fault tree shown in Fig. 2 . When all the components of the CCCG are expanded similarly, the following minimal cut sets are obtained fA 1 ; B 1 g; fA 1 ;C 1 g; fB 1 ; C 1 g; fC AB g; fC AC g; fC BC g;fC ABC g Now consider a three-component CCCG where only one component is needed for success. The Boolean expression for this fault tree is
The minimal cut sets for this group are the following fA I ; B I ; C I g; fA I ; C BC g; fB I ; C AC g; fC I ; C AB g; fC AB ; C AC g; fC AB ; C BC g; fC AC ; C BC g; fC ABC g
As discussed in reference [1] , a common convention is to treat equation (1) as a partition, so the events in the partition are considered to be mutually exclusive. This leads to cut sets such as {C AB , C AC }, {C AB , C BC }, and {C AC , C BC } being dropped. This is a reasonable convention as it is difficult to justify their validity; in practice it is difficult to distinguish them from C ABC , and they contribute insignificantly to the total probability of failure. Eliminating these cut sets gives the following reduced Boolean representation of CCCG failure
It can be seen immediately that this expansion results in a proliferation of cut sets, which has created practical difficulties when dealing with complex systems. The potential difficulty involving the implementation of this procedure is one of the motivations for a thorough and systematic CCF
COMPONENT-A
A-I C-AB C-ABC C-AC Common-cause failure analysis in event assessment screening in earlier steps in order to minimize the size of the expanded fault tree. Despite the potential difficulty in implementation, this procedure provides the analyst with a systematic and disciplined framework for inclusion and exclusion of commoncause events with adequate assurance that the resulting model of the system is complete with respect to all possible ways that common-cause events could impact the system. Another advantage of this procedure is that once the CCBEs are included in the fault tree, standard fault tree techniques for cut set determination and probabilistic quantification can be applied without concern about dependencies due to CCF.
REVIEW OF BPM ASSUMPTIONS AND ALPHA-FACTOR PARAMETERIZATION
Quantification of fault trees requires transformation of the system Boolean representation into an algebraic one involving probabilities of the basic events. This step is transparent to the user of most fault tree software since such software has built-in quantification capabilities. It is important, however, to recognize that the algorithms used for quantification of the fault tree in these software packages may involve assumptions and approximations, such as the rare event approximation. By definition in the BPM, events A I , B I , and C I are independent. Using this fact, and employing the rare event approximation, the failure probability of the two-out-of-three system is given by
The BPM for CCF contains an underlying assumption of symmetry: the probabilities of similar events involving similar components (i.e. events in the same CCCG) are the same. This approach takes advantage of the physical symmetries associated with identical redundant components in reducing the number of parameters that need to be quantified. For example, in the above equation it is typically assumed that
In other words, the probability of occurrence of any basic event within a given CCCG is assumed to depend only on the number and not on the specific components in that basic event. This is called the symmetry assumption. A later section of the paper will address the situation in which this assumption is not satisfied as a result of a degraded component. With the symmetry assumption and using the notation just introduced, the CCCG failure probability under the rare event approximation can be written as
For quantification of the expanded fault tree The BPM uses these Q ðmÞ k values to calculate CCCG failure probability. In terms of the Q ðmÞ k values, the total failure probability of a component, Q t , can be written as
In the standard approach to the BPM, Q t is conserved as CCCG redundancy changes. However, Q k (m) varies as the level of redundancy (m) changes.
Alpha-factor parameterization
For several practical reasons, it is often more convenient to rewrite the Q ðmÞ k values of the BPM in terms of other more easily quantifiable parameters. For this purpose, a parametric model known as the alpha-factor model has been adopted by the NRC [1] . The reasons for this choice are that the alpha-factor model: (a) is a multi-parameter model that can handle any redundancy level; (b) is based on ratios of failure rates, which makes the assessment of its parameters easier when no empirical data are available; and (c) has a simpler statistical model, and produces more accurate point estimates as well as uncertainty distributions compared with other parametric models that have the above two properties. The alpha-factor model develops CCF probabilities from a set of failure ratios and the total component failure probability (Q t ). The parameters of the model are Q t = total failure probability of each component due to all independent and CCF events a k = fraction of the total number of failure events that occur in the CCCG that involve the failure of k components due to a common cause Using these parameters, depending on the assumption regarding the way components in the CCCG are tested, the probability of a CCBE involving failure of k components in a CCCG of m components is given by the following (see reference [1] ):
• for a staggered testing scheme
• for a non-staggered testing scheme or if there is no testing scheme
where
As an example, the probabilities of the basic events of the three-component CCCG are written as (assuming staggered testing)
Therefore, the CCCG unavailability of equation (6) can now be written as
CONDITIONAL PROBABILITY AND EVENT ASSESSMENT
Conditional probability is defined by the following Basically, when the aim is to estimate the probability of an event, conditional upon the occurrence of another event, conditioning on the event that has occurred is carried out. Thus, the proper figure of merit is a conditional probability. That is
This will be illustrated with a sample problem, which will not consider CCF. The method will address only how to estimate the effect of conditioning upon a failed component. This must be understood first before the problem is complicated with CCF. The Containment Cooling System (CCS) from the SAPHIRE Demo Project [18] will be used. Figure 3 shows the CCS fault tree. Tables 1 and 2 contain the basic event probabilities and the minimal cut sets for the system, respectively. The rare event approximation yields 2.12 · 10 À2 for the system failure probability.
Conditional probability calculation
In order consider the case of failure of CCS, conditional upon the failure of EDG A (event DG-A in the fault tree), a new fault tree will be constructed, which will provide the answer to the numerator of equation (14) . The top event of this new fault tree is failure of CCS and failure of DG-A. The top gate is an AND logic gate with two inputs: the basic event DG-A, and the top event of the CCS fault tree. The conditional probability of CCS given failure of DG-A will be calculated using the definition of conditional probability given in eqaution (14) . Table 3 shows the cut sets for CCS \ DG-A. The probability of this joint event (using the rare event approximation) is 5.82 · 10 À4 . The failure probability of DG-A equals 2.0 · 10 À2 . Thus, the conditional probability, Pr[S|A] is obtained by dividing 5.82 · 10 À4 by 2.0 · 10 À2 . This gives 2.91 · 10 À2 , which is the conditional probability that is sought here.
EXAMPLE PROBLEM TO ILLUSTRATE CCF ADJUSTMENTS
Consider a CCCG of size three. The components are denoted by A, B, and C. Two CCF-susceptible failure modes will be considered: failure to start, denoted by S, and failure to run, denoted by R. The S and R can be a superscript, subscript, or a regular letter, depending upon the context. Details of the calculation for this case will be presented to illustrate how the result depends upon the underlying BPM and associated simplifying assumptions, the definition of conditional probability, and the alpha-factor parameterization of the BPM. Some of the equations have been stated earlier, but are repeated here so that the reader does not have to make reference to earlier sections. It is also useful to restate the equations, because some of the notation for this section is slightly different, a complication necessitated by including multiple failure modes. Using the BPM, the total failure to start of component A is defined by the following equation
where A t S = total failure to start of component A from all causes A S = failure to start of component A from independent causes 2.0 · 10 À2 C-MOV-A 5.0 · 10 À3 C-MOV-B 5.0 · 10 À3 C-MOV-1 1.0 · 10 À3 C-PUMP-A 3.0 · 10 À3 C-PUMP-B 3.0 · 10 À3 C-CV-A 1.0 · 10 À4 C-CV-B 1.0 · 10 À4 TANK 1.0 · 10 À7 Table 2 Minimal cut sets for the example CCS fault tree Cut set number Cut set probability Cut set 1 2.0 · 10 À2 DG-B 2 1.0 · 10 À3 C-MOV-1 3
1.0 · 10 À4 C-MOV-B, DG-A 4 6.0 · 10 À5 C-PUMP-B, DG-A 5 2.5 · 10 À5 C-MOV-A, C-MOV-B 6 1.5 · 10 À5 C-MOV-A, C-PUMP-B 7 1.5 · 10 À5 C-MOV-B, C-PUMP-A 8 9.0 · 10 À6 C-PUMP-A, C-PUMP-B 9
2.0 · 10 À6 C-CV-B, DG-A 10 5.0 · 10 À7 C-CV-A, C-MOV-B 11 5.0 · 10 À7 C-CV-B, C-MOV-A 12
3.0 · 10 À7 C-CV-A, C-PUMP-B 13 3.0 · 10 À7 C-CV-B, C-PUMP-A 14
1.0 · 10 À7 TANK 15
1.0 · 10 À8 C-CV-A, C-CV-B S AB = failure of components A and B to start due to common causes S AC = failure of components A and C to start due to common causes S ABC = failure of components A, B, and C to start due to common causes As mentioned earlier, the suggested convention of reference [1] will be followed, and it is assumed that this representation of A t S constitutes a partition. Similarly, total failure to start of components B and C is defined by the following equations
The terms in these equations are defined analogously to the ones for component A. Total failure to run of component A is defined by a similar equation
where A t R = total failure to run of component A from all causes A R = failure to run of component A from independent causes R AB = failure of components A and B to run due to common causes R AC = failure of components A and C to run due to common causes R ABC = failure of components A, B, and C to run due to common causes Similarly, total failure to run of components B and C is defined by the following equations
The terms of these equations are defined analogously to the ones for component A. The success criterion considered here is that one of the three components must function. Thus, to have failure of the system, all three components must fail. They can fail to start or fail to run. The fault tree is shown in Fig. 4 . Note that this is not typical of most PRA fault trees, as it has been expanded to include all elements of the BPM, which are needed for the exact solution. Table 4 lists the failure probabilities for the failure-to-start and failure-to-run modes, including CCF parameters. Table 5 lists the basic event failure probabilities produced by the alpha-factor parameterization of the BPM, assuming staggered testing. Table 6 shows the quantified cut sets. Note that cut sets such as S AB S AC have not been included, as discussed above. However, other similarly structured cut sets, such as R AC S BC are included, because each term is a contributor to the total failure probability of a component to run or start, respectively. Hence, in order to conserve the total probability of failure for each component, these terms must be included. The total failure probability for the three-train CCCG is 1.24 · 10 À4 . Table 7 shows a summary of the contributors to this failure probability. Now that the necessary machinery is in hand, the calculations needed to adjust CCF probability for an observed failure will be illustrated.
Failure to start with CCF potential
The conditional failure probability of the CCCG is now estimated given that component A fails to start, and this failure has the potential to be shared with the other two components in the CCCG. To obtain the cut sets for the numerator of the calculation, a fault tree is constructed with the top event in Fig. 4 ANDed with A T S . Table 8 lists the 22 cut sets for this case along with the numerical results. Note that, among these results, are cut sets such as {A-S, R-ABC}. This cut set may appear odd, as it seems to imply that component A both fails to start and fails to run. However, R-ABC is a contributor to the total failure-to-run probability of components B and C. This probability has not been changed by the failure of A to start, so such terms remain in the results.
The conditional failure probability is obtained by dividing each cut set's probability by the total A-R, B-S, C-S 3 1.561 · 10 À6 A-R, B-R, C-R 17 2.797 · 10 À7 A-S, B-S, C-R 4
1.543 · 10 À6 B-R, R-AC 18 2.797 · 10 À7 A-S, B-R, C-S 5
1.543 · 10 À6 C-R, R-AB 19 1.645 · 10 À7 C-S, S-AB 6
1.543 · 10 À6 A-R, R-BC 20 1.645 · 10 À7 B-S, S-AC 7 6.607 · 10 À7 A-R, B-S, C-R 21 1.645 · 10 À7 A-S, S-BC 8 6.607 · 10 À7 A-R, B-R, C-S 22 1.184 · 10 À7 A-S, B-S, C-S 9 6.607 · 10 À7 A-S, B-R, C-R 23 4.455 · 10 À9 R-AC, S-AB 10 6.530 · 10 À7 B-S, R-AC 24 4.455 · 10 À9 R-BC, S-AB 11 6.530 · 10 À7 C-S, R-AB 25 4.455 · 10 À9 R-AB, S-AC 12 6.530 · 10 À7 A-S, R-BC 26 4.455 · 10 À9 R-BC, S-AC 13 3.886 · 10 À7 C-R, S-AB 27 4.455 · 10 À9 R-AB, S-BC 14 3.886 · 10 À7 B-R, S-AC failure-to-start probability of component A (i.e. 0.005). The results are contained in the last column of Table 8 . The total conditional probability is equal to 5.400 · 10 À3 . Table 9 shows a summary of the contributions to this conditional probability. Note that contributions come from failure to start, failure to run, and mixed CCF cut sets.
INDEPENDENT FAILURE TO START
Conditioning upon an independent component failure (i.e. a failure with no potential for shared common-cause mechanisms with other components in the CCCG) is the exception, rather than the rule. The root cause for component failure often goes undetermined for quite some time, with only the proximate cause of failure being known in such cases.
There is an inherent bias toward optimism in ruling out CCF when often it may be difficult to identify the root cause of the failure accurately. There have been events recently that were analysed under the NRC's ASP program [16] , where repetitive component failures were seen over a period of years, and, each time, the utility had confidently misidentified the root cause of the failure. The CCF mechanism was there all the time, but it took years of failures for the utility to zero in on it. Conditioning upon independent failure, rather than total failure, leads to a non-conservatively low estimate of the conditional probability of failure for the affected CCCG if causes are indeed shared among members of the CCCG. Therefore, such conditioning requires very clear and strong evidence that the observed failure was truly independent. This evidence must demonstrate that there was no shared cause among the failed component and the other components in the CCCG, or that there were no coupling mechanisms, the latter being a very unlikely outcome for a group of redundant (as opposed to diverse) components.
For this case, one component is failed and sufficient information exists for it to be determined that the failure was an independent failure and did not affect the other components in the CCCG. Since this is an independent failure, conditioning is on A I rather than A t .
Assume that the success criterion for the CCCG is one-of-three. The numerator cut sets for the conditional probability that the CCCG fails, given that component A has failed independently, are derived in equation (19) . In deriving this result, the assumption that the BPM constitutes a partition of each failure mode has been applied. This leads to the elimination of cut sets such as A I
The results of applying this calculation to the sizethree example above are shown in Table 10 .
TEST OR PREVENTIVE MAINTENANCE OUTAGE
In this case, the condition is that one component in a CCCG is out of service for preventive maintenance or testing. Again, a CCCG of size three will be considered, with components designated A, B, and C, and a one-of-three success criterion. It is assumed that component C is unavailable due to preventive maintenance, and that it is not in a failed state (as it would be if the maintenance outage were for corrective maintenance). Although component C is out for preventive maintenance and thus cannot itself fail, the potential exists for causes and coupling factors still to be shared between component C and the other A-S, B-R, C-R 6.607 · 10 À7 1.32 · 10 À4 3 A-S, R-BC 6.530 · 10 À7 1.31 · 10 À4 4
A-S, R-ABC 4.340 · 10 À7 8.68 · 10 À5 5 B-R, S-AC 3.886 · 10 À7 7.77 · 10 À5 6 C-R, S-AB 3.886 · 10 À7 7.77 · 10 À5 7
A-S, B-S, C-R 2.790 · 10 À7 5.58 · 10 À5 8
A-S, B-R, C-S 2.790 · 10 À7 5.58 · 10 À5 9
A-S, S-BC 1.645 · 10 À7 3.29 · 10 À5 10 B-S, S-AC 1.645 · 10 À7 3.29 · 10 À5 11 C-S, S-AB 1.645 · 10 À7 3.29 · 10 À5 12
A-S, B-S, C-S 1.184 · 10 À7 2.37 · 10 À5 13
A-S, C-R, R-AB 7.575 · 10 À9 A-S, C-S, R-AB 3.206 · 10 À9 6.41 · 10 À7 20 A-S, B-S, R-AC 3.206 · 10 À9 6.41 · 10 À7 21 R-ABC, S-AC 2.961 · 10 À9 5.92 · 10 À7 22 R-ABC, S-AB 2.961 · 10 À9 5.92 · 10 À7 Totals 2.699 · 10 À5 5.400 · 10 À3 Table 9 Contribution to conditional probability in Table 8 Total conditional probability 
where C m denotes that component C is unavailable due to testing or preventive maintenance.
UNEQUAL FAILURE PROBABILITIES -ASYMMETRIC CCCG
As discussed earlier, the BPM assumes that the components in a CCCG all have the same total failure probability, Q t . If this is not the case, then the BPM cannot be applied in its standard form. Some PRA software packages such as SAPHIRE [18] have modules that automatically calculate CCF probabilities based on a particular parameterization of the BPM. For example, the NRC Standardized Plant Analysis Risk (SPAR) models all rely on the alpha-factor parameterization. The analyst supplies the input parameter values and the size of the CCCG, and SAPHIRE calculates the CCF probability.
If the Q t values are not equal across the components in the CCCG, say, because one component is temporarily degraded and thus has a higher failure probability than the other components in the CCCG, then the automatic calculation will fail. As a workaround to this problem, the Frechet-Hoeffding upper bound on joint probability distributions can be invoked [19] . Intuitively, this bound is easily understood with a Venn diagram. Consider two events, A and B, which represent component failure. Assume for specificity that Pr(A) < Pr(B). The Venn diagram in Fig. 5 illustrates this situation. The area of each ellipse represents the probability of that event, with the area of the enclosing rectangle normalized to unity.
The probability that both A and B fail is given by the joint probability, Pr (A, B) . In the Venn diagram, this is represented by the area of overlap of A and B. The largest this overlap area can be is A, the smaller of the two ellipses. Thus, Pr(A, B) 6 Pr(A). This result can be made rigorous and extended to more than two events. This result is referred to as the Frechet-Hoeffding upper bound, i.e. Fðx 1 ; x 2 ; . . . ; x n Þ6 min½F 1 ðx 1 Þ; F 2 ðx 2 Þ; . . . ; F n ðx n Þ: ð23Þ
This result, which is expressed as a bound on a joint cumulative distribution function, can be translated to the current situation by letting each of the x i values be a Bernoulli random variable, taking on a value of 0 for failure and 1 for success. The implication of this result for CCF adjustment is that a work-around for the case of unequal Q t values is to set each of the Q t values in the CCCG equal to the smallest of the individual values. This will ensure consistency with the Frechet-Hoeffding bound, above. As an example, consider again the size-three CCCG from above. Now assume that component A is degraded, so that its total failure probability (A t ) is increased from 0.005 to 0.02. The probabilities for B A Fig. 5 Venn diagram illustrating Frechet-Hoeffding upper bound Table 10 Cut sets and conditional probabilities given A fails to start with no CCF potential Number Cut sets
Cut set probability
Conditional probability 1 A-S, B-R, C-R 6.607 · 10 À7 1.35 · 10 À4 2 A-S, R-BC 6.530 · 10 À7 1.33 · 10 À4 3 A-S, R-ABC 4.340 · 10 À7 8.84 · 10 À5 4 A-S, B-S, C-R 2.797 · 10 À7 5.70 · 10 À5 5 A-S, B-R, C-S 2.797 · 10 À7 5.70 · 10 À5 6 A-S, S-BC 1.645 · 10 À7 3.35 · 10 À5 7 A-S, B-S, C-S 1.184 · 10 À7 2.41 · 10 À5 8 A-S, C-R, R-AB 7.575 · 10 À9 1.54 · 10 À6 9 A-S, B-R, R-AC 7.575 · 10 À9 1.54 · 10 À6
10
A-S, C-S, R-AB 3.206 · 10 À9 6.53 · 10 À7
11
A-S, B-S, R-AC 3.206 · 10 À9 6.53 · 10 À7 components B and C remain at their nominal value of 0.005. Considering a two-of-three success criterion, the minimal cut sets are fA I ; B I g; fA I ; C I g; fB I ; C I g; fC AB g; fC AC g; fC BC g; fC ABC g Cut sets C AB , C AC , and C ABC are affected, while cut set C BC will remain at its nominal value as it does not involve component A. Cut sets C AB , C AC , and C ABC will be quantified using equation (11) , but, with Q t set equal to 0.005, the minimum of 0.005 and 0.02. Thus, the CCF probability is not impacted by the degradation of component A. Implicit in this analysis is the assumption that the cause of degradation affects only component A. Had two of the three components been degraded (so that their resulting total failure probabilities were equal), then two of the Q 2 terms would have been calculated using the degraded Q t , while the remaining Q 2 , as well as Q 3 , would be calculated using the minimum Q t . Note that Q 1 is calculated using the degraded Q t , as the probability of independent failure will increase with component degradation.
CONCLUSIONS
It has been have shown in this paper how adjustments to CCF probabilities in fault tree models should be made, based on the underlying BPM. Fully expanded fault trees have been used, showing all of the terms in the BPM for each failure mode. The definition of conditional probability was used, along with laws of Boolean algebra and partitioning assumptions that simplify the BPM to derive exact expressions to quantify the conditional probability of CCF, given failures with common-cause potential, independent failures, and preventive maintenance or testing outages of components within a CCCG. Finally, a work-around was illustrated for the case in which the symmetry assumption of the BPM is not satisfied. These methods are being implemented in a revised CCF module in the SAPHIRE software package [18] , which is used by the NRC in its SDP [15] and ASP programs [16] .
